In light of all the recent hype surrounding an issue that has long been very important to me but was largely unknown to many people until last week, I feel the need to clarify a few things and address some of the flurry of criticisms that have emerged. Please note that what I say here expresses my own personal views and does not necessarily represent the views of Resolve, Invisible Children (IC), the campaign, etc. Now I’m going to come right out and say it: I support the Kony 2012 campaign, which aims to drastically raise public awareness about the abuses of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) which has been terrorizing civilians in east and central Africa for 26 years, and to use this momentum to urge the US to increase “support for robust efforts by the United States to see Joseph Kony, the leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army, and his top commanders brought to justice and the group’s atrocities permanently ended."( H.Res. 583) I realize that there is a huge amount of criticism against the campaign, particularly in its approach, and that supporting it puts me at odds with a lot of people who I respect greatly, especially considering my Brunonian background. I myself have at times been sharply critical of certain IC policy/decisions, but in this case am not. Whether I actually liked the film is irrelevant. I recognize that there are some “problematic” aspects of the campaign. As there are with any campaign, especially of an advocacy flavor. I will admit, if I were the king of the world and had made all the decisions on this, I would not have taken this approach or made some of these decisions. But I believe that this approach and these decisions will probably be more effective at supporting peace in the region in the end, which is all of our ultimate goals.
Yes, informed activism is key. So is informed criticism. Before making a judgment, please educate yourself about the issue and campaign. Specifically I urge you to read:
• FAQs
• Other important things to read are the bill & the administration's strategy that mandated the US’ action
· If people are going to use the infamous and oft-reposted scathing Foreign Affairs (Schomerus/Allen) article they at least ought to glance at Resolve’s response to its serious and somewhat unfounded accusations.
Many of the critiques of the campaign to which I’m referring are summed up here, by a highly influential blogger who has (perhaps even inadvertently) kind of spearheaded the counter-campaign. I apologize for not summarizing them here, I’m sick of rereading them. The most scathing are:
Initial reactions
A good introduction is this quote: “My sense of a lot of the criticism to date is that it is often off target, poorly supported, and poorly informed. I think it is time to deepen the debate. This means understanding something about the budgets of non-profits before we assess the budget of one. It means giving examples that clarify our criticism and that support it. It means asking about what the alternatives are. It means explaining why a given approach is wrong, not simply ascertaining that it is wrong. It means checking sources and contexts. We are all part of an historic political movement right now—let’s make it a thoughtful, civil, and constructive one,” Richard Matthew of UC Irvine writes in a detailed and balanced analysis of the campaign here.
I am absolutely thrilled at the amount of awareness the campaign has already generated, which exceeded any of our wildest dreams. For all the flack it’s received, when is the last time this issue has appeared on the front page of the New York Times? Or received prominent national news coverage, spots on major talk-shows, discussions around the average American’s kitchen table, chats by random people in line at the store, and tweets by highly-followed celebrities, even previously non-actorvists? I believe the answer is never. To people who’ve been involved in the campaign for a while, so accustomed to “what’s Uganda?,” blank stares, sighs and TIA attitudes, “that’s nice dear but when are you going to get a real job?,” “Is that like Darfur?” or “Oh right, I saw that Hotel Rwanda movie,” and “Well the crazy hippies are at it again”—it’s a welcome change.
100 million people are listening. Millions of newly-aware people have expressed interest in taking political action on the issue. They understand the basics we’ve been trying to drill into everyone’s head for years. It’s becoming a household topic of conversation, part of the public consciousness and a prominent part of the political agenda. It’s completely unprecedented in its scope, success, and potential implications. I feel like my world’s been turned upside down, like I’m living in a dream. I’m flabbergasted this is suddenly, finally, in the limelight. I honestly want to cry with happiness when I see random people at the coffee shop, my aunts and cousins a family friends, celebrities and old schoolmates—people I’ve never seen riled up about a political issue, never heard express an interest in international affairs or human rights, talking about this issue. Not just talking. Getting passionate, emotional, engaged, moved by it. I can’t even process the potential this has to completely change the game—and not even just for the LRA issue, but for advocacy and international human rights issues and politics stretching far beyond this.
Critiques, motivations, and implications
So I am wondering about the motivations, even subconscious motivations, behind some of the criticism of this campaign. There is a quote from the book Mountains Beyond Mountains, about Paul Farmer whom I respect greatly, that I find particularly apt to this situation: “They talked about issues such as political correctness, which Jim Kim defined as follows: ‘It’s a very well-crafted tool to distract us. A very self-centered activity. Clean up your own vocabulary [discourse] so you can show everybody you have the social capital of having been in circles where these things are talked about on a regular basis.’” A lot of the current criticism about the campaign could be interpreted as an extension of this.
I promise I’m not trying to accuse anyone, and say this as someone who has frequently fallen into these same habits, particularly at Brown. I have, in my days, said the words “problematic,” “neocolonial,” and “unpack,” more than is, strictly speaking, necessary. But the longer I’ve been out of academia (note: only 2 years), the more I see the importance of reflecting on the practical utility of such discourse. The impacts on the ground.
If IC’s programs and political asks were, in fact, driven by and based on a grossly skewed and oversimplified understanding of the conflict, this would indeed be cause for major concern. But they’re not. They don’t claim to be experts on peacebuilding, development, or any of that. But their programming has been profoundly informed by, shaped, and implemented by local people, and other experts. In general the critics seem to be assuming that their programs are skewed, misinformed, and off-target (mainly because of their opinions on the organization’s approach, style, and packaging) without honestly examining the programs and policy goals themselves.
Understandably and unfortunately, the prevailing trend in academic and media publication is making a stir, sometimes at the expense of a genuine search for the truth, in my opinion. Not all the discourse, but a significant portion of it. The fact is that people like controversy, it’s what they want to read, it’s what sells, and it’s what gets you noticed in academic circles. This fact is something that’s annoyed me greatly, and caused me a lot of personal angst and rants after lectures or reading things on the internet. I feel that this trend, like some of the critiques of this campaign, is downright selfish. Nicholas Kristof makes a good point in a NYT op-ed on the campaign, “I don’t know if this initiative will make a difference. But if I were a Congolese villager, I would welcome these uncertain efforts over the sneering scorn of do-nothing armchair cynics.” Sorry for the bluntness, but I’m honestly hurt and angry at some of the attacks, and take them quite personally, as many of us in the movement do because this has become for us not a job or an activity but a calling deeply entwined in our identities.
In some ways the debate about the “ethics” of the campaign actually reminds me of the debates about terminology in the US Government during the Rwandan genocide. So much focus was put on image, appearances, packaging, implications at a personal level (i.e. implications for oneself or one’s group rather than the people actually impacted), distracting from the real issues, that it paralyzed anyone from taking action, even in the case of emergency while real non-theoretical lives were at stake. A good friend of mine, who has admittedly made interesting and valid critiques of this work, once said that the worst that critiques of advocacy campaigns could do was hurt some NGO workers’ feelings. Unfortunately, I don’t think that’s true. It can have real political implications on the ground.
I fear that even misinformed and somewhat baseless criticisms may discredit organizations supporting this campaign, to the degree that politicians, officials, and people who wield power may be afraid to support or associate with it, regardless of their actual opinions on the issue. The more theoretical the critiques become, the more disconnected from the situation on the ground (examined well here by a good friend of mine currently on the ground doing research on the current situation, policy implementation, and local sentiment), the more potentially dangerous they become. And the less valid they become, in my opinion, though unfortunately they do not similarly become less influential.
Programming
So what are IC’s actual on-the ground programs? What does their (supposedly ill-begotten and mismanaged) funding go to support? I’ll highlight their 3 main on-the ground programs:
• Visible Children scholarship program in Uganda. (Note: Ironically, this is also the name of the blog that is the main critic of the campaign) A lot of literature on postconflict recovery and development, psychosocial reintegration, etc. supports the critical importance of postconflict education. Furthermore, access to education is one of the most important concerns for families and individuals directly impacted by the conflict. This is supported by my own (albeit quite limited) research in northern Uganda, as well as by that of people much cleverer and more prestigious than I am (the Women’s Commission on Refugee Women and Children, Survey of War Affected Youth [SWAY], UN, UNICEF, Interagency Network on Education in Emergencies [INEE], etc.) Furthermore, in my (albeit limited, and also qualitative rather than quantitative, but this is an opinion piece so I’m going for it) research, I found that IC’s was actually one of the most comprehensive and effective of the many scholarship programs in the region (some reasons: its focus on multiple aspects of education, psychosocial as well as economic support, an emphasis on follow-up, focus on both physical infrastructure and resources and improving the quality of education/teaching, and a focus on filling the gap in secondary-school support). I have seen many critiques of the vague “IC funding/focus/donations/etc.” but few that actually critique this program that their funding goes to. So… that puzzles me.
• HF radio towers. The area where the LRA is currently operating is one of the most remote, impoverished, isolated, devoid of physical infrastructure and development, and politically marginalized areas of the world. IC’s radio towers are having absolutely ground-breaking impacts on these communities, providing in some cases the only way to communicate rapidly and effectively between communities to warn of LRA movements and impending attacks, share intelligence and information, and communicate between communities and security forces to sound the alarm. They are literally saving lives, and having profound impacts on civilian protection. It’s pretty hard to argue with that. Some might say it’s facilitating government rollback. Possibly true. However, considering the historical trends in these areas and prevalent political sentiment in their national governments, major communications infrastructure development is unlikely to come soon. LRA attacks, however, are. As in there were several this week, and probably will be more next week. So weigh the options. And above all, consider what those on the ground might want.
• Come home messaging. IC is also playing a major role in supporting come-home messaging (distribution of multi-lingual, culturally-sensitive, and above all effective leaflets and radio broadcasts urging lower-level LRA fighters to defect). These programs were initiated by the UN, and are supported by local security forces and community groups. And most of all, they’re working. A number of recent returnees have specifically cited these outreach programs as the reason they defected. Recent reports say that Kony himself has seen the leaflets and is getting angry about them because he knows they’re working. It’s odd, it’s not the first approach I, or many people working on this issue, might have taken on the problem, or expected to be effective. But considering IC’s faith in the power of media, it makes sense they would support it, and have faith in its efficacy. And by goodness, they were right.
Christopher Blattman, a respected blogger, and academic on this issue has in the past made strong critiques of IC (which are interestingly being quoted much more than a recent shockingly kind-of supportive piece he wrote on the campaign.) In said recent piece, he calls the bracelets being promoted as a fundraiser throughout this campaign “silly.” Possibly true. But people are much more likely to donate $30 if they get a cheap, “silly” bracelet out of it. And look at where IC funding goes. So, perhaps the silliness is worth it.
Now I'm going to go through some of the main criticisms/critiques/attacks on the campaign and express my thoughts on them.
1. Oversimplication
The most common criticism of the campaign, and the movie in particular, is that it oversimplifies the issue. And the answer, is, yes, it does. That’s the point. It’s kind of like a pack of literary critics tearing apart a new novel without even bothering to crack the spine. It’s completely understandable that the cover is simplified and flashy. There are space (and marketing) limitations. You’d have to use size .1 font and make it poster-sized to fit the entire contents on the cover, and most people wouldn’t give it a second glance on the bookstore display, which would kind of defeat the whole purpose of publishing a book, especially one with a message. Not everyone is crazy enough to devote years of their life to studying this issue, and even then wouldn't fully understand it. So, like in any campaign, the issue is distilled, pared down, even ‘dumbed down’ one might say. 100 million people are not going to watch a 5-hour documentary on the issue or read a book on it. Admittedly, IC could have done a better job of complexifying the issue, even in that 30 minutes. But, my previous point still stands. And that tweet you saw yesterday is most definitely not the end game.
The whole purpose of this campaign is to advance a political “agenda” that is anything but oversimplified, emotionalized, misinformed, and juvenile. Even if at first glance, admittedly, the campaign appears so. I really would love for everyone who has seen the film, particularly those that have criticized it, to read this policy report detailing the policies advanced by the campaign, something which has been encouraged by the directors in explaining the campaign.
· Broadly speaking, increasing US and international diplomatic support towards ending the conflict
· Improving coordination between regional governments and militaries on responding to the conflict, particularly in the areas of intelligence coordination and operational planning
· Improving the training, capacity, professionalism and behavior of security forces
· While at the same time ensuring they have the resources (both material and diplomatic) to effectively fulfill their mandate—particularly in the areas of intelligence technology, communications infrastructure, and mobility support (especially helicopters). It’s honestly ridiculous how few resources they have and at the same time what high expectations are demanded of them.
· Ensuring that said international logistical, diplomatic, and material support is not prematurely withdrawn, which could honestly make things worse in the end for the people impacted by the violence.
· Drastically scaling up security forces’ focus on civilian protection, even perhaps at the expense of apprehension operations. Also, trying to ensure that this support is not distributed in a way that exacerbates regional tensions and resentments.
· Increasing support for relief aid, development assistance (particularly to Uganda), come-home messaging, and disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation, and reintegration (DDRR) programs
If someone wants to debate/critique these objectives, I’d be happy to, as would many people in the movement (particularly the press contacts and policy developers who I encourage you [the world at large] to contact and offer suggestions/alternatives.) I and most people involved with this campaign stand firmly behind these objectives and hope that this campaign spreads them and builds the political will and momentum to finally get them implemented. (I think/hope this is working, this link to the report has been getting 30,00 hits a day since the launch of the campaign.) And many policy makers and the Administration have come out and expressed support for the campaign and the objectives. A resolution was recently introduced in the House "expressing support of robust efforts by the United States to see Joseph Kony, the leader of the Lord's Resistance Army, and his top commanders brought to justice." I honestly think that most of these objectives are pretty non-controversial; the only reason they haven’t yet been implemented is that they haven’t yet been made a political priority for our leaders, largely because there hasn’t been widespread, mainstream public awareness and noise advocating their support, despite our best efforts. I really hope that changes with this campaign, and think it actually might. Finally.
2. You’re advocating an overly-militaristic solution, playing into the military-industrial complex and supporting a US-as-world-police function/This is just like Vietnam/Somalia/you’re a war monger
This is a very serious accusation, and one that particularly touches a nerve with many of the activists in the movement, who generally have great respect for peace--after all, that's our ultimate goal, that's why we're doing all this. Obviously. First off please take a look at what the advisers are actually doing. See their stated mandate. It’s been clearly established that the US advisers were not sent in to fight, and would only use force in self defense. Their mandate is actually kind of limited, probably in response to fears about a repeat of Somalia, Vietnam, Libya, Afghanistan, Iraq, Korea, etc. Although I think the frequent comparisons to these cases are off-mark, and don’t fully consider the very different contexts of these situations. And I don’t buy the oft-cited slippery slope argument. Political action comes from popular mandate (ideally), and (ideally) learns from past mistakes and takes into account current political dynamics and realities on the ground. If you’re that against future international interventions, advocate against them, be my guest, but don't oppose urgent current action simply to avoid setting precedent.
I don’t think international interventions are inherently wrong (though many do disagree with me), provided they’re implemented correctly, regulated, multilateral, and done for the right reasons. But I’m by no means a war-monger, which is true of most of the people in this movement. Quite the opposite. They’re largely a bunch of modern-day hippies. But they recognize the importance of civilian protection. That’s our only goal. It’s not about fighting fire with fire—it’s about sending in the firefighters (ok, poor word choice) and enforcing fire code regulations, sometimes forcefully.
US support for regional militaries is focused on increasing their effectiveness and coordination. Support has largely been non-lethal (in fact, I haven't seen any evidence of lethal support, though obviously not all such military info is public). What have they paid for in the past? Largely: uniforms, training, intelligence-gathering technology, building capacity through coordination, and logistical support (see Paul's paper, and State Department releases). It seems logical that continued support would be along those same lines, the less controversial the better, especially considering current controversy over far more high-profile and politically higher-stakes international interventions. Having better tools, coupled with stronger oversight, will make regional militaries better at accomplishing their mission, which will have direct benefits on civilians. What more military support are the so-called off-target/warmongering activists proposing?
• More logistical/transport support, especially helicopters for rapid response to threats to civilians and to intelligence that could lead to apprehension of top commanders
• Better technology and intelligence gathering capacity/intelligence coordination so vulnerable communities will have warning and a better chance at escape/protecting themselves, and so regional militaries will be more effective at responding to threats. This would also help counter the edge the LRA has developed through its long history of evading the UPDF, and its ingenious adaptations in organizational structure, operational strategy, and communications that have hampered regional militaries' efforts for so long.
• Better communication, cooperation, and diplomatic and operational coordination to make regional militaries more effective in their pursuit of civilian protection and apprehension
• Basically, the military support being advocated would make regional militaries more effective--better resources mean operations can be more targeted, reducing civilian/abductee casualties, and also mean LRA attacks will be hampered, meaning fewer civilians die. And it's pretty hard to argue with that.
Everyone would be thrilled if Kony came running out of the bush chucking aside the AK-47’s saying “Never mind, changed my mind about that peace agreement, someone get me a pen!” But the odds of that happening are quantumly low. Despite youthful idealism, we must consider the realities on the ground, and learn from the past. We have to be practical. Kony’s had tons of opportunities to end the conflict peacefully. But he’s refused time and time again, and actually used those opportunities to build up his forces and resources and supplies, which made things worse for the population in the long run. It would be irresponsible to let this happen again.
It’s frustrating that there’s a prevalent knee-jerk reaction against any type of military action, with very little attention given to what that military action actually entails. I’m no fan of the US military, and recognize that they have many problems. But as a military brat myself, I know that they’re not all bad people, many servicemembers are genuinely trying to do the right thing. And honestly, sometimes they’re the best (even when not theoretically ideal) people for the job. And yes, there are conspiracy theorists that may say the military is lying about what they’re doing and conducting covert operations (though I think that’s far less likely in a situation like this where US security interests are not at all at stake). But by that same logic, for all we know the US military could be conducting covert operations in Greece and South Africa and France. That’s unlikely to change because of the deployment of 100 military advisers to central Africa.
I understand the moral resistance to any type of violence, particularly to being responsible for any type of violence. But in a way, isn't not preventing violence when you have the power and ability to do so just as bad as committing violence yourself? And we’ve got to look at the larger context. It’s kind of selfish to prioritize avoiding potential blood on your hands if this means they’ll definitely be a lot more blood on other people’s hands, people who are being far less careful and conscientious about it, as a result. Weigh the options practically, not theoretically.
And, just for kicks, compare this to another situation. In a hostage crisis, when the perpetrator has absolutely refused negotiation, and has sworn to kill the hostages, the moral thing to do is send in the national guard or whoever. Or another example. To some degree, this isn’t a war; it’s a particularly bloody and long-lasting spate of gang violence. I think most people wouldn’t be against police action, even force, to protect bystanders and arrest the ringleaders of a gang rampage if this would end the violence. And as “problematic” as this is, in these countries the military and police are pretty intertwined. The affected populations don’t have a police force protecting them. All they’ve got is informal local militias and national and international militaries. So these groups need the resources to get their job done, or it won’t get done and the local populations are the ones that will suffer.
3. You’re secretly a tool of AFRICOM.
There is absolutely no evidence to support this. I know the founders of these organizations, and assure you they’re not the puppets of AFRICOM, and that no conspiracy theories were validated through their creation or programming decisions. And see my response to the last question about knee-jerk assumptions of ulterior unsavory motives to any Western action/intervention.
4. Yes, but why aren’t you saying anything about arms trafficking/the Kivus/malaria/Afghanistan/domestic poverty/global warming?
All noble issues, but this is kind of a moot point. If that’s your thing, then go for it, more power to you. But there are only so many hours in a day. And if you try to fix everything, you’ll achieve nothing. You have to focus. But not talking about other things should not negate what we are talking about.
5. You naively think re-tweeting P-Diddy’s latest is going to save the world./You’re just jumping on the bandwagon, and don’t really care about this issue/You’re just doing this because you think it’s cool
We may be idealistic, but we’re not stupid. Perhaps some of the people retweeting do believe this. But I think most people would realize it doesn’t. Maybe some people are just jumping on the bandwagon. But most of us that work on this issue would have run out of steam a long time ago if that were really our only motivation. Those that naively retweet are unlikely to have a significant political impact either way, so I see them as largely harmless. If anything, at least in the future they will be better-informed, and possibly more likely to engage in/follow politics. Which is a good thing. Uninformed political activism, though potentially dangerous, is unlikely to be all that effective, precisely because uninformed activists don't know how to effectively advocate. It's up to the people that are informed to get the public more informed (as this film attempts to do by taking the knowledge of the target audience--people who previously had no idea any of this was going on--from nada to a wee bit and get them impassioned enough to seek out more knowledge on the issue). It's also our responsibility to exert political pressure to ensure well-thought-out actions are the ones implemented, and to get leaders elected who can see through stupid policy suggestions and have the backbone to make the choices that are in the best public interest.
6. Your goal is awareness as an end in and of itself
The whole point of this campaign is political action. However, building awareness is a critical first step. Definitely not the only step, but a necessary one for any political change to take place. A critic of the campaign said, “This [approach] is far from ideal for an issue which arguably needs action and aid, not awareness.” But you can’t really separate these. The awareness (a key component in building political will) has not been at a sufficient level to generate the action and aid needed to end the conflict yet. So building that is the first step towards change. A lot of people now know the basic, pretty non-controversial facts of the situation (there is a conflict, who Kony is, what the LRA is, Kony’s crimes and indictment by the International Criminal Court, a tiny bit about the existence of child soldiering, postconflict reconciliation, and international justice.) They don’t know everything, and of course have the potential to use this limited knowledge in a dangerous way. But I think anyone who is moved enough to take concrete political action to a degree that will actually have a significant impact on the issue will also be motivated enough to learn more about the issue to do so responsibly and effectively.
IC has, at times, not done the best job of communicating the connections between awareness and these political asks. But they’re getting better at it, particularly with support from other organizations with more experience in policy. And in the coming days, I know they and others in the movement will do their best to channel this flood of attention to effective political action. For more, please read IC’s recent release “From Awareness to Action,” a mass communication to Kony 2012 supporters outlining concrete steps for, well, doing that. Also, the Resolve website in general, as they're basically spearheading the policy side of the campaign.
7. You’re propping up the Museveni regime, completely ignoring the abuses of his government and the Ugandan military.
If true, this would be one of the most troubling claims against us. But it’s not. Organizations supporting this initiative have always been quite vocal about the abuses of the Ugandan army and government. Sometimes to a degree that I’ve worried it might hinder their impact on the ground. And the support advocated by the campaign would not enhance the power of the Museveni regime per se or contribute to further human rights abuses. The US is not just throwing handfuls of cash at the Ugandan military (UPDF), or the Ugandan government, nor do they have any plans to do so.
In fact, US support to the Ugandan military is contingent on the UPDF’s improving professionalism and respecting human rights, as Johnnie Carson, the US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs explains here, “We have continued to provide logistical support for their operations on the condition that they remain focused on the mission, cooperate with the other regional governments, and do not commit abuses.” (Obviously in some cases that’s not going to happen, the behavior of any military isn’t perfect unfortunately, but that’d be the case with or without US support). The move has been supported by both people in the majority party and opposition political leaders in Uganda, such as Norbert Mao who speaks in the video.
Increasing diplomatic engagement by high level US and international officials will put more pressure on the Ugandan government to conform to internationally-accepted norms about human rights and political freedoms, not give them a carte blanche to flout the law. By shining the international spotlight on regional armies, the US can help ensure that reforms are fully implemented, and use the leverage generated by international support to help improve their professionalism and effectiveness.
8. You’re financially exploiting others’ suffering/You all are just in this for the money/glory
This is the most confusing and unfounded claim I’ve heard yet, and it’s surprisingly widespread. Will someone please tell me where these supposed riches are? I could use them to pay my student loans. But honestly, we’re quite open about our finances and have nothing to hide. They’re available here and here and freely available on the websites of other organizations that support the campaign. $46,667 is the highest salary paid by Resolve, according to their last tax forms, and $89,699 is the highest in Invisible Children. Neither is unreasonable, especially considering the areas of operation (DC/San Diego). Even the CEOs are in the 99%. And as this writer points out, would it even be so bad for NGO workers to make decent paychecks, when people of comparable positions in for-profit companies still make far more, and their work has less focus on benefiting society? However, most of the employees of these organizations make way less. Many are qualify-for-foodstamps poor. Not that this makes us morally superior or anything, but it does make the prevalent allegations that we’re rolling in the dough at the expense of African children (the most colorful attack I heard yet was "you're feasting on the riches of suffering African children!") kind of unfair.
But the real point is that this is a not-for-profit campaign. Money is raised to support programs that benefit those impacted by the war and that attempt to help bring an end to the violence. No one is trying, or succeeding, in "getting rich off of this." It is frequently assumed that they are, especially by critics in Uganda (though I don't think that extends to the tri-border region). But these accusations seem to stem mostly from a lack of understanding of the realities of the finances and programming of the organizations. Sure, it makes a better story to say "Scandal! Supposedly well-meaning hipsters actually just stealing money from African children." But it's simply not true.
Similarly, the allegations that we’re doing it for the fame are unfair. The members of this movement who actually get any spotlight are few and far between. As are the moments where we get praise rather than rejection-- we usually have people ignoring us, people criticizing us, people saying it’s a marginal issue, people turning us down and fighting us at every turn. It’s largely exhausting, depressing, and thankless work. Again, not that this makes us morally superior or anything, and in a way we’re lucky because we’re able to do what we love. But it does make the argument we’re doing it for fame and fortune kind of invalid. I encourage anyone who is making these claims of exploitation to look at the facts of the finances and be specific with allegations of financial mismanagement and exploitation.
9. But only 37% “reaches” the ground. How can you say that's not corruption?
In order to effectively evaluate an organization, you have to look at it in terms of its stated objectives. You don't cut down a math teacher if her students' scores in French don't rise. Nor would you expect a student in "Introductory Overview of Western Dance Forms" to advance as quickly in ballet as a student in "Intensive Beginning Ballet." True, only about a third of IC's donations go to direct, on-the ground programs like school scholarships. But that's by design--IC is mainly an advocacy NGO, and one of their stated objectives is increasing youth political consciousness about global issues and participation in the political process. It aims to do this as well as work as an NGO advancing development and postconflict recovery in Uganda and central Africa. Like Jason said in an interview, "That's our model. That's who we are. We're not World Vision. We are not these other organizations that do amazing work on the ground. If you want to fund a cow or you want to help someone in a village in that component, you can do that. That's a third of what we do." It's fine if you think that a more effective focus would be solely on development, or activism, or youth political participation, that's your opinion. But dear media, quit acting like it's some big scandal that 63% doesn't go directly to Uganda--no one said it did, and stop implying it's lining the pockets of the activists, not invested in legit programs in the US that advance the overall stated missions of the organization.
10. Kony’s not a big deal anymore/You lot manipulate facts and mislead people to pursue your own agenda./ Kony’s not in Uganda and other things
The facts and statistics we use are rock solid. Meticulously-researched, corroborated by the UN and prominent NGOs, backed by field research. Read our footnotes, they took us a long time. Give me a stat that’s untrue. Sometimes stats are misquoted or taken out of context in the larger discourse on this issue (for example, the 66,000 figure), but not often, and when they are I think it’s not an intentional misrepresentation.
And anyone who thinks Kony is no longer a problem, no longer a threat, should take a glance at the LRA Crisis Tracker, which records almost daily attacks by the LRA on civilians in the region. Maybe there were “only” 284 attacks last year, and “only” 22 people killed in January. Indeed, the LRA was more violent in the past, but this doesn’t mean they won’t become more violent again—in fact, LRA violence is again on the rise. And maybe there are more people dying in Syria or what have you, but some peoples’ suffering shouldn’t negate others’ suffering, it’s not a zero-sum game (and see my point about global warming). The LRA may no longer be an existential threat to the Ugandan government, or to the governments of any of the affected countries. But it certainly is an existential threat to civilians in the region. And from the perspective of human security, this should be even more concerning to the international community. And it’s even more important to exert international pressure on these governments since they have less incentive to do something about the problem because it’s not considered a “major” political issue on their national agendas.
One of the critiques I’m most confused about is the accusation that IC is saying the LRA’s in Uganda. Where do they say that? The film expresses quite clearly that the LRA is not in Uganda any more. I quote: “It’s not over! And as the LRA moved into other countries, Jacob and other Ugandans came to the US to speak on behalf of all people suffering because of Kony. Even though Uganda was relatively safe.” See this screenshot from the film.
11. You’re ignoring African voices./But you’re white/the film is racist/You’re promoting a White Man’s Burden/white savior mentality
I will admit it: Jason Russell is Caucasian. Many of the people in the movement are. And then again, many are not. Supporters are a diverse group of people--not just racially, but religiously, politically, and nationally. From parents to high-schoolers, political aides to teachers, Democrats to Republicans, American college students to my Mom's class of first-generation immigrant fifth-graders, to people from Serbia, United Arab Emirates, Australia, Senegal, Uruguay, Singapore, Algeria, and many other countries, who've all contacted us asking how to help. I've always felt that it's incredibly frustrating that whenever any non-African person tries to have any interaction with issues in Africa, they are assumed to be racist, driven by superiority complexes, and to have nefarious ulterior motives. It seems racist in and of itself to automatically assume Caucasians are incapable of not being racist, of having genuine compassion and moral convictions that aren't driven by imperial/colonial/oppressive objectives.
People get involved in this cause for a variety of reasons. Some because of religious conviction, the mandate to love thy neighbor as thyself, others from a moral conviction that all people deserve the same rights and opportunities in life regardless of where they are born, others from a political conviction on respect for international law and human rights norms, or a recognition of the importance of peace and development globally. Some indeed are influenced by cultural reasons or collective memory, like being from or having ethnic ties to the region. As in the Darfur movement, Jewish activists have become involved perhaps because of collective memory contributing to a respect for human rights and protection from oppression for marginalized groups. Some may have personal reasons, such as having been to the region, having personal experience with losing a loved one, or having been personally impacted by war. (There is a touching story of a woman whose fiancé was killed in Iraq, who donated all the money they'd saved for the honeymoon to IC programs). But people really shouldn’t have to defend why they care. The bottom like is, there's a lot of reasons to get involved, and the issue goes way beyond race. It's about human compassion. The responsibility we have as a result of our common humanity to use whatever resources and opportunities we have to improve the lives of our fellows, as we would have them do for us. As is advocated in most major religious traditions and systems of ethics. People have all these and more very legitimate and sincere reasons for supporting this cause. I think the automatic assumptions of neocolonial, racially charged, nefarious ulterior motives are unfair to deny these.
Yes, IC does focus on children. But not because they feel like belittling and further victimizing them, or want to revel in the power that being Western gives them, and disempower the youth of Africa. Actually, its quite the opposite--by trying to connect people globally to what marginalized populations are experiencing and saying, they're working to reverse these global power imbalances. I hate the phrase "giving voice to the voiceless." It's more like "giving ear to the voices currently being ignored" and "knocking on the heads those sleeping in the back of the lecture hall who haven't been listening." Frankly, the core reason people are engaging in this work is because it's urgent, isn't currently being done, and needs to be done. And, like UNICEF, Save the Children, and other organizations which take this child-centric approach, it's been criticized for the potential patronizing implications of this focus. While it's important to not "infantilize" beneficiaries, the simple fact of the matter is that this war has in fact uniquely impacted children--largely because of the prevalence of child soldier use, attacks targeting children and schools, and the impact that such a long-lasting conflict has had in shaping a generation of childhoods. Because of these aspects of the war, I don't think it's disingenuous that IC portrays children so prominently in its narrative on the war, or that it focuses its programming on the demographic that has been (arguably) most impacted by the war.
And again, we need to look at the actual programming. The on the ground programs incorporate local voices in their planning and implementation. The programs themselves focus on empowerment, not patronizing charity. The education and scholarship programs, along with vocational training projects help people who have had limited opportunities because of the war to learn skills to become self-sufficient, quite the opposite of reinforcing dependency and structural inequalities. And the civilian early warning programs do the same thing--help communities access the tools they need to exercise their own agency and have a direct impact on their own security. As for the advocacy messaging, I'll admit that hasn't been perfect at evading this narrative, but I earnestly believe they've done their best to balance avoiding reinforcing victimization with creating messages that will be most effective at resonating with people and inspiring them to take the actions needed (and supported by those being impacted by the war) to concretely improve the situation.
Also, once again, the only appropriate thing to do is defer to people on the ground currently being impacted by the violence. I know the Acholi Religious Leaders, as well as some civil society groups in northern Uganda which has been pretty much peaceful since 2006 have come out against the campaign and any type of US military support. But frankly—I’m sorry, but it’s not just about Uganda anymore. It’s much bigger than that. I don’t mean to minimize the experience of the Acholi people in northern Uganda for two decades. But it’s unethical to ignore the current context, the current populations being affected. Civil society groups in areas that are currently being targeted by LRA violence (Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, and South Sudan) have been overwhelmingly supportive of the deployment and political and military support that enhances civilian protection. And certainly local civilians (and here) have been.
Constructive criticism is good. But dear world, particularly virtual one, please remember it's far easier to criticize than to develop viable solutions. I challenge you to pursue the latter. Why is so much focus on the packaging/approach of the campaign itself rather than the actual issue? If you think its supporters are doing this, then be the bigger person and change the dialogue. But above all, where do you think those impacted by the conflict, (like the woman shot in an LRA ambush along the Sambia-Tomati road on Sunday) would want the focus placed? Put them first. I think Ida Sawyer, a Human Rights Watch researcher who's done extensive research in LRA affected areas of central Africa, put it best. “It is important for the debate to move on to the issues that really matter to the hundreds of thousands of people in central Africa who still live in fear of the next LRA attack: What will it take to capture Kony and end the LRA threat to civilians?” Remember our shared goal of peace in central Africa and put all your efforts towards achieving that.
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Again, I’d like to emphasize that these are my own opinions which are not necessarily shared as official views by any of the organizations supporting the campaign. I have never worked for IC (though have many friends and colleagues who have), but have worked for Resolve for a number of years. But I’m only saying this to give you a little background on me as an individual. Also, I'd like to clarify a common misconception: Resolve and IC are not the same organization, though Resolve (among other orgs, both formally and informally) is supporting IC in their Kony 2012 campaign. These organizations have different approaches and mandates, and at times different opinions, but share the common goal of ending the Lord’s Resistance Army conflict and supporting peace and recovery in LRA-affected regions of east/central Africa.
